Toward the end of the 1960s, moreover, Philippine economic growth slackened. Import substitution policies, which interest groups pressed upon Philippine legislators, no longer encouraged rapid growth. The Congress passed contradictory laws, and bureaucratic corruption and red tape prevented implementation of sound policies. The Philippines' neighbors, from Thailand and Malaysia in the south to South Korea in the north, instituted reforms, became stronger competitors, and achieved superior growth. The late 1960s also brought Vietnam-era student demonstrations and a mass movement for U.S. statehood in which millions of Filipino petitioners for statehood embarrassed Marcos and Philippine nationalists.
In this context, Marcos in the early 1970s faced a constitutional prohibition on running for a third term and the certainty that his life-long enemy, Benigno Aquino, would be elected as his successor. Marcos argued to close associates that the country's problems required drastic solutions. He initiated a two-year study of successful Asian martial law regimes. Leftist intellectual Adrian Cristobal, leftist leader Blas Ople, and others labored over a study of regimes that had successfully used authoritarian methods to impose reforms. Rightist defense chief Juan Ponce Enrile designed a detailed plan for martial law.
Marcos also initiated a constitutional convention, justified by nationalistic arguments about changing an unsuitable American-imposed constitution. A crucial argument at the constitutional convention concerned the duration of the interim period between the two constitutions, when the chief of state would have both the powers of the president under the old constitution and the powers of the prime minister under the new constitution. Marcos wanted this period to be indefinitely long, whereas a majority at the constitutional convention wished for a brief period. One by one, the delegates to the convention were summoned by intelligence chief General Ver, who reviewed with them their various failures to pay taxes, occasions on which their security guards had killed people under dubious circumstances, and other misdeeds which, according to the general, the judicial system would of course have to confront unless the delegates saw fit to serve their nation by voting appropriately on the duration of the interim period.
The results of this process foretold much of the future. were almost exclusively instruments of patronage rather than principle, proved impotent at defending democracy when confronted by a brilliant manipulator of personal and family interests. A society riven by poverty, inequality, corruption, and crime, and accustomed to a view of democratic politics as mere conflict over patronage, proved utterly unwilling to defend democratic principles in the face of promised improvements in economic and social conditions.
With the new constitutional arrangements well advanced and the study completed, Marcos portrayed the Vietnam-era student demonstrations as evidence of a gigantic communist conspiracy and the stratagems of his political opponents as evidence of an equally threatening right-wing conspiracy. Government soldiers shot the empty white Mercedes Benz of Minister of Defense Enrile full of holes, and the government announced that communist guerrillas had attempted to assassinate the Defense Minister. Under orders, a sergeant from the Firearms and Explosives unit of the Philippine Constabulary blew up a series of minor power pylons and other targets around Manila, and the government announced that communist guerrillas were threatening the security of Manila itself. Using such threats to justify his policy, Marcos declared martial law in 1972.
In actuality, there were fewer than 800 communist guerrillas in the Philippines when Marcos declared martial law, according to interviews with the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Vietnamera demonstrations were no more threatening to the stability of the government of the Philippines than to many other governments. The threat from the right, which Marcos portrayed in equally dire terms, was just as remote. And these facts were widely understood. But the bulk of the population supported Marcos, and the U.S. government acquiesced in Marcos's declaration of martial law, out of a broad consensus on the need for social and economic reforms that the democratic government of the Philippines had been unwilling to carry out.
Marcos proceeded to implement reforms seemingly modeled on those that had produced relatively broad and stable public support for authoritarian regimes in other Pacific Asian countries. He improved public security by prohibiting demonstrations and strikes and by confiscating tens of thousands of weapons, and introduced summary procedures to cope with street crime and other crime. The diminution of fear in the streets was palpable. He rationalized key parts of the bureaucracy, trumpeted the elimination of congressional corruption, and appointed to high office or strengthened the powers of a group of world-class technocrats such as Alejandro Melchor, Vicente Paterno, and Cesar Virata. These men inspired confidence on the part of foreign governments and attracted the support of international banks. Virata was subsequently elected the world's outstanding finance minister by vote of a group of senior international bankers.
Marcos introduced a series of wide-ranging reforms aimed at enhancing economic growth and social equality. He made huge investments to expand the nation's infrastructure. He improved the laws on taxation and investment, reorganized the management of foreign investment rules, and promised to attract foreign investments and promote exports rather than persisting with import substitution. He initiated projects and policies that attracted the strong support of the World Bank. He quickly implemented more land reform than had occurred in all 25 years of democratic rule. Associated agrarian reforms, including roads, subsidized credit for farmers, rural electrification, and irrigation led to a boom in rice production and to near self-sufficiency in rice by 1976. Dissidents nearly disappeared from Central Luzon, hitherto the country's hotbed of both religious and communist uprisings. Through various means, Marcos destroyed most of the old landed oligarchy that had dominated Philippine economic and social life since Spanish times. Marcos also reduced the Philippines' traditional discrimination against its Chinese minority by providing them greatly increased access to formal citizenship and to participation in sectors of the economy formerly closed to them.
To provide the Philippines with analogues of South Korea's Hyundai, Daewoo, and Samsung, Marcos sponsored the formation of a group of large conglomerates run by trusted associates. In the early 1970s, the most notable was the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). For the entire democratic period, the Philippines had been plagued by poor roads that had been constructed with adulterated cement and thus were largely washed away every rainy season. When martial law began, Marcos's aide Alejandro Melchor fostered a consortium of construction companies, subsequently named CDCP, and told them to complete the Manila-Baguio road on their own, with the possibility of becoming wealthy from tolls if they did it properly and the prospect of severe retribution if they did not. This project, and many similar ones, quickly improved the transportation and irrigation systems. CDCP gradually acquired a $600 million portfolio of overseas contracts and did widely admired work even on such difficult projects as the renovation of Indonesia's ancient Borobodur Temple.
Even more quickly than in South Korea and Taiwan, the Marcos reforms expanded the regime's political support. The growth rate under martial law appeared impressive and attracted support from foreign financial institutions and some domestic businessmen. The land reforms, rural infrastructure programs, and destruction of much of the landed oligarchy, along with massive credit subsidies, attracted the support of farmers. There was opposition, of course. Democratic politicians, the press, and supporters of democracy in the universities, the Catholic Church, and significant parts of the middle class demanded a return to democracy and an end to political arrests and military courts. A Christian-Muslim conflict, which had simmered for generations in the southern Philippines, exploded into a revolt of 10,000 Muslim guerrillas when the largely Christian military sought to implement the national policy of collecting firearms. To ensure military acquiescence, Marcos had to exile the country's leading military officers, including the immensely respected General Ileto, who became ambassador to Iran and later Thailand. Most businessmen other than those close to Marcos adopted a "wait and see" attitude, appreciative of real and promised reforms, but cautious regarding ultimate implementation.
Thus, the vast majority of Philippine society strongly supported Marcos. Most of the rest acquiesced in his reforms. Most people were convinced that Philippine democracy could not in any case long survive the perpetuation of crime, inequality, poverty, and incoherent economic policy. Marcos dealt ruthlessly and decisively with the senior democratic politicians and generals who represented the only serious elite opposition to martial law. Opposition by the senior generals was in any case inhibited by a strong tradition of respect for civil authority and by their own abhorrence of the social disorder and corruption that Marcos promised to abolish. Opposition by the democratic political elite was muted by the patronage orientation of so much of that elite and by the vulnerability of an overwhelming proportion of them to blackmail. Both at home and abroad, human rights protests were muted by the reassurance that "Martial Law Philippine Style" was accomplishing needed reforms with a much lighter touch than had been used in South Korea and elsewhere.
Post-1 975 Deterioration
The Economy: The progress of reform and the expectation of further reforms, and subsequently of further successes on the models of Singapore and South Korea, persisted through 1975. After 1975, the reform drive stagnated, and even reversed. As Adrian Cristobal said to me in an interview, "It was like an old lady taking off her girdle. Everything just fell out."
Land reform became bogged down in corruption and red tape. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform announced that growing numbers of Certificates of Land Transfer were being issued; it failed to mention that, after being issued, they were stored in a safe at the Ministry rather than being given to tenants. Only 10% of tenants made payments on the government loans they received to purchase their land. Hence, despite enormous early land reform efforts and successful investments in rural credit and rural infrastructure, reforms slowed and the problem of rural land ownership was deferred to the indefinite future. Gradually, peasants began selling their land back to the landlords illegally. Many Marcos cronies, including General Ver, became wealthy by accumulating supposedly land-reformed land for their own crops or fishponds.
The old landed oligarchy that Marcos had destroyed was quickly replaced by a new oligarchy composed of gigantic business conglomerates run by the President's cronies. Instead of promoting employment by focusing investment on labor-intensive industries, the Marcos regime focused on nuclear power, steel, aluminum, copper, and other capitalintensive industries, known as the eleven major industrial projects. With these developments, all hope for a reduction of the country's crushing unemployment and for a more egalitarian social structure disappeared. The eleven projects were justified by the rhetoric of nationalism and dependency theory: the Marcos regime would relieve the oppressed Filipino people of their excessive dependence on imperialist Western corporations. Much of the liberal academic and media elite believed these arguments. The business community understood the real reasons: these huge projects, utterly unsuited for the nation's skills and comparative advantages, permitted equally huge foreign borrowings, and much of the foreign borrowing could be siphoned off to Swiss bank accounts. Marcos had substituted a ruthless elite for a merely inefficient one.
Likewise, policies to promote greater efficiency and growth stagnated. Administrative reform never proceeded beyond the top. The ministers were frequently world-class managers, but underneath them there remained a morass of corruption and incompetence. Key technocrats lost jobs or confidence: Melchor was fired; Paterno eventually quit; Virata began his decade-long, Hamlet-like contemplation of a move to Washington. Instead of forcing the favored industrial groups to become more competitive and efficient by gradually increasing domestic and international competition, Marcos decreed an endless series of measures to protect his friends' conglomerates from domestic and foreign competition. CDCP became a bloated, subsidized organ of patronage. Using leftist slogans about avoiding dependency on exploitative multinational corporations, the regime created vast monopolies that squeezed the Philippine poor to the physical limit and destroyed the Philippines' system of independent entrepreneurship. Industry eventually became an incredible gridlock of monopolies. Red meat, aluminum, paper, and even videocassettes (a monopoly created especially for the President's son-in-law) became monopolies or near-monopolies enforced by presidential decrees and by special action of the tax authorities, the customs authorities, the licensing authorities, and numerous other agencies of government.
Using similar leftist and nationalistic slogans about replacing exploitative foreigners and corrupt Chinese intermediaries and improving the welfare of poor farmers, the regime created monopolies for the sugar and coconut industries. These monopolies taxed the farmer for benefits that he would never receive, increased the difference between what the farmer received and what the world market paid for his crop, and successfully siphoned off a large proportion of farmers' incomes into the hands of Marcos's cronies. Even as the regime published its denunciations of exploitation by multinational commodity firms, Marcos issued decrees that forced companies like Lever Brothers and Proctor & Gamble out of coconut products markets, where they were paying market prices to farmers, and enforced a monopoly run by his friend Eduardo Cojuangco, who paid half the world market price. The farmers' funds were used to fund three banks, which were then employed to transform the ownership of much of the Philippine economy into a small group of gigantic conglomerates. The sugar-based conglomerate expanded to include a major newspaper, radio and television stations, shipping, bus lines, automobile repair shops, and a host of other industries. The ruthless means by which this was accomplished quickly denuded the center of the country, the Visayas, of much of its middle class. The coconut conglomerate was even more far-reaching. The siphoning off of a large proportion of farmers' incomes decreased stan-dards of living and prevented modernization of these industries in the face of foreign competition.
Improvements in certain kinds of infrastructure were offset by key lapses. The power industry greatly reduced planning and investment for the future. Eventually this created a massive shortage of capacity and spare parts and left much of the Philippines, including Manila, to experience almost daily power failures. Enraged at the efforts of an American telephone company to comply with U.S. anti-corruption laws, the regime turned instead to vastly inferior European equipment, thereby worsening the unreliability of the national telephone system for the ensuing decade.
Despite impressive 1970s, growth rates were well below the disappointing growth rates of the late democratic period.
Meanwhile, the regime began accumulating a huge debt. The emphasis on capital intensive projects contributed greatly to this debt. Other contributors were massive expenditures on hotels, showcase cultural projects, and expensive international assemblages, ironically including an annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund where every delegate was assigned a brand new Mercedes Benz that was sold as a used car after the meeting. Above all, a nearly complete substitution of foreign borrowing for domestic investment ensured the rapid accumulation of foreign debt.
The net effect of these policies on the economy can be summarized in a single figure: the incremental capital-output ratio. In order to raise annual national output by one dollar, the typical Pacific Asian country had to invest two dollars. Indonesia, hobbled by inefficiency and corruption, spent four dollars. India, with worse inefficiency and corruption, has recently been spending six dollars. The Philippines in the early 1980s was spending nine dollars. Politics: Political trends followed economic trends. Marcos had initially reduced disorder and created a broad coalition of left and right. Such coalitions come in three varieties. In India during the Janata period, the broad governing coalition represented pure electoral opportunism and quickly fell apart. In Pacific Asian countries like Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea, a broad coalition sternly implemented reforms that created strong institutions, increased economic competition, improved income distribution, and focused the economy on serving international markets; by doing so, they created rapid and egalitarian growth, followed by substantial political consolidation. In Spanish America, the leftist rhetoric of antiimperialism and dependency theory has been used to justify import substitution policies abroad and statist, monopolistic economies at home, which protect the interests of entrenched inefficient industries and landed oligarchies. The elite keeps national institutions weak and therefore pliable. The result is stagnation rather than competition, accumulation of debt rather than foreign and domestic investment, huge unemployment, and rising social inequality. This Spanish American pattern leads to bankruptcy, unrest, and political turmoil. Marcos promised the Pacific Asian program, but delivered the Spanish American syndrome. His nation suffered the familiar consequences.
Crime began to rebound. Initially street robberies in broad daylight had been suppressed. But then quiet burglaries gradually increased until they completely offset the decline in street robberies. Then street robberies began to increase also. The 167 communist guerrillas in 1967 became 800 in 1972, a small guerrilla presence in four key regions of the country by 1975, and five to ten thousand guerrillas by 1980. This rise was offset temporarily by increasing successes in dealing with Muslim guerrillas, but gradually Muslim discontent and the collapse of the coconut industry gave the communists an opportunity to create organized guerrilla units in Muslim areas, supplanting tribal dissidence with modern guerrilla warfare. Businessmen, the middle class, and certain groups of farmers became gradually more concerned that the regime was not promoting their interests.
The defunct democratic patronage system no longer ameliorated strong conflicts among ethnic and regional groups, so regional antagonisms surfaced with a vengeance. The Marcos regime invested funds heavily in the Ilocos provinces from which the president's family derived. It also invested quite heavily in Manila, as Mrs. Marcos promoted beautification; in central Luzon for strategic reasons; and in Mindanao to combat the guerrillas. But other regions were systematically starved and exploited. The Visayas, home of Marcos's former rival, Vice President Lopez, and of major political competitor Osmena, were neglected by the regime and ruthlessly exploited by the sugar monopoly; many areas of the Visayas looked physically worse in 1983 than they had twenty years earlier, a rare occurrence in rapidly developing Pacific Asia. The provinces and regions of other political competitors were also systematically starved. Batangas Province, home of opposition political leader Salvador Laurel, had to watch its roads decay almost beyond the possibility of economic use. Marcos's early problem with the Muslims developed in microcosm in many other parts of the Philippines.
By the mid-1970s, an inexorable decline in military performance had become apparent. Martial law had begun with the sidetracking of the nation's most able officers. It had begun with the shift from a competent, culturally sensitive, small unit, intelligence-oriented strategy of dealing with guerrillas, a strategy that had been totally successful against communists and Muslims alike, to a strategy of using massed heavy artillery against tribal guerrilla groups in the southern Philippines. This strategy was totally ineffectual and was deplored by the U.S. army attache at the time as "nothing more than competitive ejaculation," and it produced huge numbers of refugees.6 Just at the time when Marcos had weakened the military's senior leadership, the war with the Muslims chewed up the central core of the armed forces, the lieutenants and sergeants. So many junior officers were lost that the Philippine Military Academy for several 
The Roots of Failure
Thus, by 1976, the Philippine program of authoritarian reform had begun to fail despite its rhetorical similarity to the extraordinarily successful programs in Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and elsewhere. While authoritarian reform governments in South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore (and even Indonesia to some extent) were moving to create strong military, government, and business institutions, the Marcos regime was systematically destroying them. Under Marcos's martial law, there was no vice president, and therefore no orderly succession, because Marcos cared less about orderly succession than about avoiding competition for his job. An executive committee set up in 1981 was simply an excuse for not having a successor. In the President's absence, his wife chaired the cabinet-not because of her government positions, but because she was his wife. Imelda Marcos controlled public and private funds equal to 50% of the total government budget, with little accountability. As Minister of Human Settlements, she possessed the right to seize any urban property without recourse.
In the business community, competitiveness and efficiency were replaced as criteria of success by access to the personal patronage of the President. After nine successive, self-serving constitutional revisions, the constitution had lost all institutional force. In a characteristic justification for destroying the institution of law, Supreme Court Justice Barredo declared that the country must move beyond the rule of law to the rule of justice. In the military, an extremely competent, professional, and successful military of 60,000 men had been replaced by a corrupt, incompetent organization of more than 200,000 in which all the senior generals were Ilocanos and all key promotions were based on political patronage.
Thus, while Park Chung Hee, Lee Kwan Yew, and their counterparts in successful authoritarian regimes elsewhere were above all institution builders, Marcos was above all an institution destroyer. When a Park Chung Hee or a Lee Kwan Yew passes from the scene, one knows in advance the future shape of the society. The military will retain the same shape and will be run on the same principles. Businesses will retain their basic structure, ownership, and competitive relations. The laws will change only by orderly processes. By creating these institutions, such leaders created skeletons for their society and thereby endowed their societies with form, continuity, predictability, and confidence. Marcos took over a society with far more highly developed governmental, business, and military institutions than those that existed anywhere else in developing Asia, with the possible exception of Malaysia. But, by crippling the institutions and turning them into instruments of patronage, he deprived Philippine society of its skeleton. The Marcos policy of deinstitutionalization cast into doubt the future forms of business ownership, economic structure, military leadership, civil management, and law. (Indeed, because of the degree to which Marcos associates had accumulated control of every source of wealth and power, no successor regime could hope to survive without sudden, sweeping changes of ownership, structure, and rules). Recognition of the resulting uncertainty by the business community compounded the economic rigor mortis and decay promoted by Marcos's economic policies.
The Crisis of 1981
This across-the-board deterioration after 1975 so weakened the economy that a cyclical world downturn in 1981 led to a broad political-economic crisis, based on the collapse of the coconut oil market, a financial crisis, a new constitution, a new election, political polarization, wide-ranging military misbehavior, and deterioration of President Marcos's health. While few recognized at the time the seriousness of the crisis, it foreshadowed the successive national "heart attacks" of 1983 and 1986. Economic downturn: In a world environment of slow growth, high interest rates, and low commodity prices, the Philippines-whose exports depended heavily on coconuts, sugar, and copper-suffered a 42% deterioration of its terms of trade, far more than its ASEAN neighbors. Later, the deterioration became still worse. But the consequences were nonetheless disproportionate.
In an environment of generally weak commodity prices, the new National Coconut Authority, noting that the Philippines possessed over 60% While Marcos retained most of the apparatus of martial law, there was significant liberalization. Rule by decree dwindled (although for some time decrees were backdated). Somewhat greater press freedom and political organization was permitted. In August, the right to strike was returned, subject to revocation if the government declared national security to be involved.
A new constitution, the ninth revision of the Philippine constitution under Marcos, was approved by a plebiscite in April with the usual irregularities. Its highly centralized, French-style governmental structure was quite appropriate to Philippine conditions. Although there were some peculiarities (no vice president in order to avoid creating a competitor, a minimum age of 50 for the president in order to eliminate Benigno Aquino from running), its basic structure was quite sound. The flaw was that nobody, including the elite around Marcos, viewed it as anything more than the latest tool for implementing the personal wishes of the current President. The context of deinstitutionalization deprived the document of all force and legitimacy.
Following the constitutional plebiscite, Marcos held a presidential election in June 1981, but he allowed the opposition only 28 days to organize and campaign, restricted opposition access to the media, refused a new registration of voters, and carefully controlled the Commission on Elections. Only two governorships in the country went to opposition groups. The democratic forces joined with the leftist and communist forces for the first time ever in a united front to boycott the election. But the boycott, and the success of Marcos in coercing 62% of the population to vote (of which 14% spoiled their ballots), convinced most Filipinos that the democratic opposition was impotent. In the conservative elite, this was regarded as decisive evidence that, whatever they thought about the President personally, only Marcos was capable of governing. But conversely it convinced many former members of the democratic opposition that only violence could depose the dictator and thereby pushed them into cooperation with the New People's Army. One former close Marcos associate estimated that 25% of those who had supported his own election were now collaborating with the communists. Thus, Marcos's political reforms and termination of martial law, and the democratic politicians' decision to boycott the election, severely polarized Philippine society. The old democratic politicians, previously a frail force, now became a negligible force.
Outside Manila, the most significant social development aside from the coconut collapse was widespread military brutality. As a large-scale phenomenon, this was new on the Philippine scene. Assassinations and disappearances actually declined in most of the country, except in very remote areas and in Mindanao, where the Monkees killed at will. But everyone from farmers to pro-Marcos members of the National Assembly to active generals agreed that widespread beatings of suspects and casual abuse of property became a potent force of recruitment for the radical opposition. General Ver was appointed Armed Forces Chief of Staff, edging out the West Point-trained, honest, professional General Ramos. Subsequently, Marcos and Ver gradually gutted the Constabulary, which Ramos ran, and throughout the armed forces sidetracked the careers of professional and pro-Ramos officers.
It became known that Marcos suffered from lupus erythematosis, which affected his kidneys, and this worsened business fears. While most businessmen by now disliked the regime, in the absence of stable institutions they were terrified of a post-Marcos upheaval, so business confidence deteriorated.
Economic hardship, military brutality, and the impotence of the democratic center strengthened the radical left. The communist-supported National Democratic Front acquired massive support from students, large segments of the middle class, human rights groups, teachers, dispossessed businessmen, and respected The simultaneous occurrence of all these problems constituted a major crisis in the regime, although both the Philippine government and the U.S. government refused to recognize it at the time. (The U.S. Embassy emphatically rejected reports of the spread of suffering and of NPA organization.) Nonetheless, the Philippine government's crisis response was coherent, decisive, and tactically effective. Virata and the economic managers competently contained the financial crisis. Marcos's imaginative political moves contained the political crisis. But, once the national heart attack was over, the buildup of social arteriosclerosis continued: the financial situation deteriorated steadily, political support eroded steadily, communist guerrilla organization proceeded, and Marcos's health slowly worsened.
The Crisis of 1983
By the beginning of 1983 the Philippine economy was weak, its finances perilous, and its political support nearly gone. The government was running huge deficits in order to finance the bankrupt companies of cronies. Privately and publicly, in such organizations as the Makati Business Club, businessmen were actively expressing their dissent, and a leading group prepared a paper systematically and overtly challenging government policies. The Catholic Church decided in the spring to initiate publication of two newspapers designed to spread truths the government was attempting to suppress. These developments signified the shift of the center of the business community and the Catholic hierarchy from passive discontent to active opposition. The core of the Philippine elite now actively opposed Marcos. Marcos fully recognized the magnitude of the threat. Imelda offered Aquino a huge bribe to stay in Boston. Then she warned him that the Marcoses might not be able to control their own people if he came home and that his life might be in danger. Then the Philippine government threatened Japan Airlines' landing rights if it carried Aquino to the Philippines.10 When Aquino arrived at Manila Airport, he was escorted from the airplane to the tarmac by three uniformed soldiers. He was assassinated immediately after leaving the airplane with the soldiers. The Philippine government stated that the assassination was carried out by a hired killer, acting on behalf of the Communist Party, who was executed on the scene by Philippine troops. The government was unable to explain, however, the trajectory of the bullet, the relative positions of the bodies of Aquino and his alleged killer, the absence of blood from the alleged killer's body, the reason why such a distinguished figure under a death threat (who had always been heavily guarded by senior officers in the past) was so lightly guarded this time, the reasons for sending on vacation that weekend the senior officers of the unit that had trained all week on red alert to guard Aquino, and other critical circumstances of the assassination. Popular skepticism about the government position was universal. Subsequent findings by a judicial board-for instance, that the alleged killer, rather than being a communist, was in fact a long-time associate of General Luther Custodio, the man assigned by the government to protect Aquinodeepened that skepticism.
Just as the assassination of Aquino did not cause the financial crisis, it also did not cause the political and moral crises. These crises came to a head in the spring of 1983 after years of germination. They decisively preceded the assassination and were by themselves sufficient to ensure the eventual downfall of Marcos. The assassination focused attention on the preexisting crises and precipitated broader public involvement and more explicit political action. Most notably, it drew the business elite and the clergy into the streets.
Aquino's return home resulted from the financial, political, and moral crises, as well as from Marcos's illness, all of which led Aquino to believe that the regime was vulnerable. Moreover, because the regime itself believed it was vulnerable, senior figures in the regime perceived no alternatives to desperate action. At the beginning of the third week of August 1983, the Marcos administration was insolvent, morally discredited, and devoid of a domestic political base aside from the immediate beneficiaries, family, and ethnic group of the President. All the senior figures, including the President himself, believed there was good chance that Marcos was dying. (As a result of this belief, Marcos forced Benedicto and other cronies to transfer key properties from their ownership to his children.) Given the weakness of the regime and the overwhelming threat posed by Senator Aquino in these circumstances, the only viable strategy to defeat his challenge and to perpetuate the regime was assassination.
In this situation, contrary to the established view that the assassination caused the collapse of the regime, or even accelerated Marcos's decline, the assassination was a successful stratagem to delay the consequences of the Marcos regime's political, moral, and financial bankruptcy. It was successful even though Marcos turned out to be less ill than he thought, because the illness of the regime was more terminal than the illness of Marcos. It removed the only effective challenge to a collapsing regime and left the opposition in the hands of a group of well-intentioned, eloquent, and democratic but previously discredited political leaders. Although the assassination heightened opposition political activity and marginally accelerated the administration's financial problems, these developments would not have brought down the regime in the absence of otherwise fatal crises. The regime suffered a heart attack in 1981 and a truly massive seizure in the spring of 1983. Only emergency political surgery enabled the patient to survive another two-and-a-half years. The post-assassination demonstrations, dramatic as they were, fell into the category of post-operative pain.
Knowledge of this strategic reality, conviction that the leadership was utterly amoral, and knowledge that many other opponents of Marcos had met violent deaths, persuaded much of the Filipino elite that senior figures in the regime must have been responsible long before concrete evidence became available. This broadly accepted belief, rather than any details of judicial inquiry, drove the subsequent consequences of the assassination.
After the assassination, latent opposition became far more vocal, and the government's base of support became still narrower. The crowds at Aquino's funeral were the largest in modern Philippine history, exceeding those at the Pope's visit, MacArthur's sentimental return, and Magsaysay's funeral. Business leaders organized huge antigovernment demonstrations, with the support of clergy, labor, farm groups, and much of the civil service. The regime was unable to mount effective counterdemonstrations or to regain the loyalty of the majority of its own employees. One effort to organize a pro-Marcos demonstration by government employees backfired when most arrived with signs saying, "Marcos resign."
The government did, however, retain the ability to deploy its military forces and the ability to use state firms, state banks, crony firms, and crony banks to control much of society. The democratic opposition, although vocal, remained militarily impotent, politically divided, and utterly devoid of a persuasive program for economic revival and social justice. The result was a Polish standoff: as in Poland, near-universal social discontent was unable to overthrow a government backed by the military, but the government was incapable of reviving the economy. Like Jaruzelski, Marcos had the powerful backing of a superpower which believed that, however serious the country's problems, only Marcos could solve them. In early 1984, it appeared that, as in Poland, the stalemate might persist indefinitely. Fourth, because of this high-level disunity and fear, the government was immobilized from acting on the two greatest national crises since World War II, the financial crisis and the security crisis. In the financial crisis, the government wishfully expressed a belief that the IMF would come around to the government's point of view or that in the end the U.S. government would bail out the Philippines, or that after all the situation was not so bad as one would have thought. In the security crisis, minor tactical changes and wishful reform plans substituted for decisive action. It was characteristic of 1985 that while Armed Forces Chief Ver was on leave to stand trial for murder and General Ramos was Acting Chief of Staff, at the height of a great national emergency, President Marcos deprived Ramos of all authority to make major changes in personnel, deployments, or strategy. Moreover, Marcos bargained with the United States by threatening to throw out his most competent aides: he conveyed threats that if the IMF pressed too hard for reforms, Virata would be fired, and that if the U.S. pushed too hard for retirement of General Ver, then General Ramos would be retired.
From Stalemate Toward Revolution
Fifth, the democratic opposition proved its relentless capability to mount a series of demonstrations in the face of all the physical, financial, and legal threats that the authoritarian Marcos regime could muster. The demonstrations were organized and staffed primarily by businessmen and religious people, not by workers and peasants. The vast majority of government employees expressed support for the opposition. The regime had lost all legitimacy and authority with the Filipino social elite, and had lost the ability to act on even the greatest national emergencies.
Any regime is composed of an executive leadership, a group of institutions through which the leadership's policies are implemented, and a social base that supports the regime with resources and obedience. By mid-1985, the Marcos regime had a weak and fearfully divided executive leadership, a collection of emasculated institutions, and a social base confined to the few remaining cronies who weren't bankrupt, senior military officers who were increasingly unsure of the loyalty of their troops, a nervous network of political officials who knew they had no future after Marcos, and Ilocano communities for whom ethnic ties remained paramount. Each of the bases of social support was a rapidly dwindling asset, particularly when the regime had no money to cultivate its supporters or clothe its army. In short, the Marcos regime was a hollow shell.
It What distinguished the election of February 7, 1986. from earlier Marcos elections was the incoherence of the regime. All the familiar tactics were used: monopolization of the media, intimidation of the opposition, payoffs on an extraordinary scale, efforts to deprive the opposition of funds and transport, inadequate provision of time for the opposition to organize, stolen ballot boxes, mistabulation of the results, and many others. But the machinery didn't work quite as it had in the past. Government and military people did their jobs, but reluctantly and within limits. Political officials mechanically did their tasks, but a large proportion of Marcos's closest associates did so while privately expressing total contempt for him. In the election itself, military units remarkably often alleged communications failures that made them unable to receive Marcos's orders. Or they experienced transport breakdowns that allegedly made them unable to implement the orders. Some computer operators who were mistabulating the votes walked out and took refuge in a convent rather than complete their tasks. The wealthy elite, the natural supporters of the regime, poured out of their penthouses to support the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel) in its fight against electoral cheating. Although people still felt deeply anxious, the immobilizing fear of Marcos, which had served as the regime's ultimate weapon in earlier years, had simply vanished. The business community and the Church listened to Marcos's threats, shrugged, and sallied forth.
Nonetheless, the regime stole the election and declared itself the winner. What followed was a classic demonstration of a hollow regime's inability to deploy force against an adversary. Cory Aquino brought up to two million people into the streets and the regime was helpless to stop it. She launched a boycott of crony firms, and the regime was too weak to defend itself. While the Marcos regime had survived demonstrations, including some very big ones, and while it had endured economic problems, including some very big ones, feuding between factions of the Marcos regime now became decisive. General Ver and Defense Minister Enrile plotted against one another. Minister of Industry Roberto Ongpin and General Ver had been at loggerheads over control of the black market. One of General Ver's operatives died after being arrested on Minister Ongpin's orders. Ver ordered the arrest of Minister Ongpin's bodyguards, who were among Minister of Defense Enrile's reformers. Minister Enrile received evidence that he was going to be arrested, decided to revolt, and appealed to his old friend General Ramos for support.
The revolt of Ramos and Enrile was popular but appeared to be militarily indefensible. Their compound seemed to be totally vulnerable. Marcos's forces were close by and overwhelmingly superior. But Marcos, like his counterparts in Paris 1789 and Moscow 1917, proved unable to deploy his forces. At first, faced by fatal divisions among the closest colleagues of a lifetime, Marcos could not make the decision to destroy the revolt with force. He pleaded futilely with Ramos and lost vital hours. Then he tried to deploy his forces. First, he sent the tanks, headed by a ruthless colonel. But crowds of people flooded the streets and even the ruthless colonel turned back when a classmate stood in front of his tank, accompanied by his wife and children, and invited the colonel to shoot. Then Marcos deployed an 81mm mortar unit to shoot over the heads of the crowd, an easy operation. But the mortar unit filtered through the crowd and joined the insurgents. Then Marcos deployed helicopters. But the helicopters joined the insurgents. Then Marcos sent a transport unit south to pick up loyal troops. But the transport, also commanded by a military reformer, took off and landed a few miles away, while continuing to send Marcos false messages about its progress southward. Marcos's huge military forces were completely paralyzed. His political allies were fatally divided. The game was over.
By mid-1985, the regime had collapsed internally, although few recognized it, but the beneficiaries remained unclear. The logical beneficiaries did not include the democratic politicians. They were discredited and divided. There were a dozen political parties, none of which had a persua-sive economic program or the backing of a major social force. The overwhelming majority of Filipinos still believed the old politicians to be thoroughly discredited.
The logical beneficiaries did include the radical left, the broad united front organized by the Communist Party of the Philippines. The left had great numbers. It had good organization. It had an economic program. Although only a very small proportion of Philippine society was prepared to back Communists, the situation was tailor made for Communist manipulation. Only the collaborators of the radical left seemed to be capable of credible resistance to the hated dictator. Only they offered a theory, however inadequate, for national economic revival. They had only to administer the pinprick. They could quickly move into power. Their economic theories would have definitely destroyed what remained of the Philippine economy, probably causing mass starvation, but they would by then have had the opportunity to eliminate all opposition. The Philippines would have been Nicaragua writ large. But the left opted for a boycott, making the same mistake the democratic parties had made in 1981. By thus failing to deliver the pinprick, they failed to benefit from deflation of the balloon.
Cory Aquino, on the other hand, rejected a boycott, set out to overcome the disparity of organization, and created a miracle of democratic unity and effective campaign organization. With the old democratic politicians trailing behind, unable to raise their own funds or draw their own crowds, she delivered the pinprick and became the beneficiary.
Having deflated the balloon, Cory Aquino moved into an organizational vacuum. Her new regime had vast public support, but it did not have a unified executive leadership or effective institutions, such as a reliable military, a unified national political party, or competent civil administration. It was, in short, the beneficiary of a vacuum, not of a functioning machine. And, despite all the very real democratic euphoria, its social base was a populace that had repudiated democracy once before for not delivering growth, equity, and order, and would quickly do so again if those values still proved lacking. It was sophisticated on political coalition-building, but deeply divided on economic policy. The prospects for Marcos's successor will hinge almost exclusively on her ability to fill the organizational vacuum and deliver economic performance.
